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Abstract
This paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by
Grossman and Helpman (1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our
approach does not require any data on political organizations. We formally
show that the PFS model provides the following prediction: in the quanitle
regression of the protection measure on the inverse import penetration ratio
divided by the import demand elasticity, its coeﬃcient should be positive at the
1quantile close to one. We examine this prediction using the data from Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000). The results do not provide any evidence favoring
the PFS model.
1. Introduction
Recently there has been much interest in political economy aspects of trade policy.
This growing interest is in part triggered by the theoretical framework in the Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) “Protection for Sale” model (hereafter the PFS model).
Empirical studies such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000) found that the data on trade protection are consistent with predictions
by the PFS model. In particular, their results show that as predicted by this frame-
work, protection is positively related to the import penetration ratio for politically
unorganized industries, while negatively related for politically organized ones.
An important issue in these empirical studies is how to classify industries into
politically organized and unorganized ones. When classifying industries, Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)h a v ee n c o u n t e r e dt h e
following problem: while only politically organized industries are assumed to make
campaign contributions in the PFS model, their data indicate that all industries make
Political Action Committees’ (PAC) contributions. Thus, if they were to follow the
2assumption in the model, all industries would be classiﬁed as politically organized.
To overcome this problem, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000) used some simple rules for classiﬁcation. However, those rules are
somewhat arbitrary and subject to the possibility of misclassiﬁcation.
More recently, a second generation of empirical studies has taken a diﬀerent ap-
proach to reconciling theory and the data. For example, Ederington and Minier
(2006) extend the PFS model by hypothesizing that industries can lobby for both
trade and domestic policies. In their model, it is possible that some industries are
politically unorganized for trade policies but make contributions for domestic poli-
cies. Matschke (2006) takes a similar approach. Since the models by Ederington
and Minier (2006) and by Matschke (2006) are more comprehensive than the PFS
model, the authors impose additional assumptions to make the models tractable for
estimation.
This paper proposes a new approach to testing the PFS model. Unlike most
previous studies, our approach does not require classiﬁcation of industries into orga-
nized and unorganized ones. This is important both because of the above mentioned
problems in such a classiﬁcation and because political contribution data itself is not
available for most countries. In this manner, our approach can expand the realm of
application of such models.
3Our approach exploits the following prediction of the PFS model: politically
organized industries should have higher protection than unorganized ones given the
inverse import penetration ratio and other control variables. This suggests that
industries with higher protection are more likely to be politically organized, and
thus for those industries, we should expect a positive relationship between the inverse
import penetration ratio and the protection measure.
We provide a formal proof of the above argument within the framework of recent
work on quantile regressions and quantile IV’s. To empirically test this implication,
we use estimation techniques such as quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978)
and instrumental variable quantile regression (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004a;
2004b, 2006). Our results suggest that there is no strong evidence in favor of the
PFS model. The point estimates indicate that the inverse import penetration ratio
is negatively related to the protection measure at high quantiles, which is the exact
opposite of what the PFS model predicts. Importantly, this evidence is robust to a
number of sensitivity analyses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
PFS model and past empirical studies. Section 3 details our approach to testing the
PFS. Section 4 brieﬂy describes the data used in this study. Section 5 presents the
estimation results. In Section 6, we further discuss our results and also examine the
4validity of an alternative model. Section 7 concludes.
2. The PFS Model and Its Estimation in the Literature
2.1. The PFS Model
The exposition in this section relies heavily on Grossman and Helpman (1994). There
is a continuum of individuals, each of inﬁnitesimal size. Each individual has prefer-
ences that are linear in the consumption of the numeraire good and are additively
separable across all goods. As a result, there are no income eﬀects and no cross price
eﬀects in demand which comes from equating marginal utility to own price. On the
production side, there is perfect competition in a speciﬁc factor setting: each good
is produced by a factor speciﬁc to the industry, ki in industry i, and a mobile factor,
labor, L. Thus, each speciﬁcf a c t o ri st h er e s i d u a lc l a i m a n ti ni t si n d u s t r y .S o m ei n -
dustries are organized, and being organized or not is exogenous to the model. Tariﬀ
revenue is redistributed to all agents in a lump sum manner. Owners of the speciﬁc
factors in organized industries can make contributions to the government to try and
inﬂuence policy if it is worth their while.
Government cares about both social welfare and contributions made to it and
puts a relative weight of α on social welfare. The timing of the game is as follows:
ﬁrst, lobbies simultaneously bid contribution functions that specify the contributions
5made contingent on the trade policy adopted (which determines domestic prices).
The government then chooses what to do to maximize its own objective function.
In this way, the government is the common agent all principals (organized lobbies)
are trying to inﬂuence. Such games are known to have a continuum of equilibria.1
By restricting agents to bids that are “regret free” equilibrium bids have the same
curvature as welfare, and a unique equilibrium can be obtained.2 The equilibrium
outcome, thus, is as if the government was maximizing weighted social welfare (W(p)
where p is the domestic price and equals the tariﬀ vector plus the world price vector,
p∗) with a greater weight on the welfare of organized industries. Thus, equilibrium





where J0 is the set of politically organized industries and the welfare of agents in
1Given the bids of all other lobbies, each lobby wants a particular outcome to occur, namely,
the one where it obtains the greatest beneﬁt less cost. This can be attained by oﬀering the minimal
contribution needed for that outcome to be chosen by the government. However, what is oﬀered
for other outcomes (which is part of the bid function) is not fully pinned down as given other bids,
it is irrelevant. However, bids at other outcomes aﬀect the optimal choices of other lobbies and as
their behavior aﬀects yours, multiplicity arises naturally. Uniqueness is obtained by pinning down
the bids at all outcomes to yield the same payoﬀ as at the desired one, i.e., the bids are “regret
free”.






where πj(pj) is producer surplus in industry j, lj is labor employed in industry j, wage
is unity,
Nj
N is the share of workers employed in the jth industry, while T(p)+S(P)
is the sum of tariﬀ revenue and consumer surplus in the economy.
Diﬀerentiating Wi(p) with respect to pj gives3
xj(pj)δij + αi
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where so δij =1if i = j and 0 otherwise, αi is the share of labor employed in industry
i, m0
j(pj) is the derivative of the demand for imports, and xj(pj)=π0
j(pj) denotes




























3This follows from the derivative of consumer surplus from good j with respect to pj being equal
to −dj(pj),w h e r edj(pj) is the demand for good j.
7Now
P
i∈J0 αi = αL, the employment share of organized industries and
P
i∈J0 δij = Ij
is unity if j is organized and zero otherwise. Therefore, this equation can be reduced
to




j(pj)(α + αL)=0 .
If we further use the fact that (pj − p∗
j)=tjp∗













mj(pj) and ej = −m0
j(pj)
pj
mj(pj). This is the basis of the key estimating
equation. Note that protection is predicted to be positively related to
zj
ej if the
industry is organized, but negatively related to it if the industry is not organized,
and that the sum of the coeﬃcients is predicted to be positive.
2.2. A Problem in Estimation – the Classiﬁcation of Industries










The error term is interpreted as the composite of variables potentially aﬀecting pro-
tection that may have been left out and the measurement error of the dependent
8variable. To deal with the fact that a signiﬁcant fraction of industries have zero


















ej: γ<0, δ>0 and γ + δ>0.4 To test these predictions, equations (2.1)
and (2.2)(hereafter called the PFS equations) have been estimated in a number of
previous studies (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), McCalman (2001)).
Although data on the measure of trade protection, the import penetration ratio,
and the import-demand elasticities are often available, it is harder to deﬁne whether
an industry is politically organized or not. To deal with this problem, Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) use data on campaign contributions at the three-digit SIC industry
level. An industry is categorized to be politically organized if the campaign contri-
bution exceeds a speciﬁed threshold level. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) used
4Goldberg and Maggi (2000) and others note that γ<0, δ>0 and γ + δ>0 are only
necessary conditions for the validity of the PFS speciﬁcation. However most empirical research
in the political economy of trade claim that the right sign of the coeﬃcients of the PFS equation
gives strong empirical support of the PFS paradigm. Recently, Imai et al. (2006) criticize them by
p o i n t i n go u tt h a te v e nw h e ne s t i m a t i n gt h eP F Se q u a t i o no na na r t i ﬁcial data simulated from a
simple quota model that has no PFS element, one will obtain the parameter estimates consistent
with the PFS hypothesis.
9ad i ﬀerent procedure for classiﬁcation. They run a regression where the dependent
variable is the log of the corporate Political Action Committee (PAC) spending per
contributing ﬁrm relative to value added and the regressors include the interaction
of the import penetration from ﬁve countries into the sub industry and the two-digit
SIC dummies. Industries are classiﬁed as politically organized if any of the coef-
ﬁcients on its ﬁve interaction terms are found to be positive. The idea is that in
organized industries, an increase in contributions would likely occur when import
penetration increased.
Note that both these two procedures are questionable. The procedure used in
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) implicitly assumes that all the contributions are di-
rected towards inﬂuencing trade policies. Moreover, any non zero cutoﬀ level of
contributions as indicating organization seems relatively arbitrary. In addition, the
procedure does not control for other variables that potentially inﬂuence political
clout such as industry size and electoral districts where the industry is concentrated.
T h ep r o c e d u r eu s e db yG a w a n d ea n dB a n d y o p a d h y a y( 2000) might have a potential
identiﬁcation problem, since a function of the import penetration is used to classify
industries and the import penetration divided by the exchange rate is concurrently
used as a regressor in the PFS equation. That is, the positive coeﬃcient on the
interaction term of the political organization and inverse import penetration ratio
10could be because the protection measure is a nonlinear function of the inverse import
penetration ratio and the exchange rate.
Recently, Cadot et. al. (2006)p r o p o s ead i ﬀerent approach that that does not
require any data on political organization. Instead of deriving the political organiza-
tion dummy in an ad-hoc manner, they propose to recover it as a by-product of the
estimation process. Speciﬁcally, they initially set the political organization dummy
to zero for every industry. Then, they estimate the PFS equation and obtain the
error terms. If the error term of an industry is greater than some threshold value,
its political organization dummy is set to be one. The idea is that such industries
do not ﬁt the unorganized category.
Using the generated political organization dummies, they again estimate the PFS
equation and obtain the error terms. They repeat the procedures of generating the
political organization dummies and estimating the PFS equation until the parame-
ters converge. Their method is attractive since information that has been used to
classify industries (e.g., contributions) is unavailable in many countries. However,
their approach by construction creates a positive correlation between the error term
and the generated political organization dummies, which cannot be overcome by any
conventional instruments.
113. A Proposed Approach
3.1. Quantile Regression
In this section, we detail our approach to testing the PFS model. The advantage
of our approach is similar to that of Cadot, Grether and Olarreaga (2006)( C - G - O
for short) in the sense that the approach allows us to test the PFS model without
using data on political contributions, directly as in G-M or indirectly as in G-B or
iteratively as in C-C-O, to construct an organization dummy. However, our approach
substantially diﬀers from theirs: instead of classifying industries as organized or not
in some manner, our estimation procedure relies heavily on the relationship between
observables implied by the PFS model.
Equation (2.2) and the restrictions on the coeﬃcients have at least two implica-
tions. First, as has been discussed in the literature,
zj
ej has a negative eﬀect on the
level of protection for politically unorganized industries while it has a positive eﬀect
for politically organized industries. Second, given
zj
ej, politically organized industries
have higher protection. These implications lead to the following claim: given
zj
ej,h i g h
protection industries are more likely to be politically organized and thus eﬀect of an
the increase in
zj
ej on protection tends to be that of politically organized industries.
T h er e l e v a n tp r o p o s i t i o n ,a n dp r o o f ,c a nb ef o u n di nA p p e n d i x1 .T h ep r o p o s i t i o n




ej,t h ec o e ﬃcient on
zj
ej
12should be close to at the quantile close to γ + δ>0 at the quantiles close to τ =1 .
Let Tj =
tj
1+tj and Zj =
zj
ej. Using quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett,
1978), we estimate the following equation:
QT (τ|Zj)=α(τ)+β (τ)Zj/10000. (3.1)
where τ denotes quantile, Tj =
tj
1+tj and Zj =
zj
ej,a n dQT (τ|Zj) is the conditional
τ−th quantile function of T. If the PFS model is correct, it is expected that β (τ)
converges to (γ + δ) > 0 as the quantile, τ,approaches its highest level of unity from
below.5 We use part of the data used in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)6.T h e
data consist of 242 four-digit SIC industries in the U.S. See Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000) for a description of the variables.
I nt h eq u a n t i l er e g r e s s i o n ,Z is assumed to be an exogenous variable. However,
Z is likely to be endogenous as discussed in the literature and hence the parameter
estimates of the quantile regression are likely to be inconsistent. It is therefore
important to allow for the potential endogeneity of Z. We formally show that even
in the presence of endogeneity, the main prediction of the PFS model in terms of
5The estimation results are presented in Table 1. The estimation is
done by using a MATLAB code written by Christian Hansen (available at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/christian.hansen/research).
6We are grateful to Kishore Gawande for kindly providing us with the data.
13our quantile approach does not change. The relevant proposition (proposition 2), an
analogue of proposition 1, is presented in Appendix 1B. To test the prediction in the
presence of possible endogeneity of Z, we estimate the following equation by using
IV quantile regression (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004a; 2004b; 2006):
P (Tj ≤ α(τ)+β (τ)Zj/10000|Wj)=τ (4)
where W is a set of instrumental variables.
Importantly, nowhere in equations (3) and (4) is the political organization dummy
present; these equations involve only variables that are readily available. This way
our approach does not require classiﬁcation of industries in any manner whereby we
can avoid biased results due to misclassiﬁcation.
4. A Brief Description of the Data
We use part of the data used in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (hereafter also
referred to as GB). The data consist of 242 four-digit SIC industries in the United
States. In the dataset, the extent of protection t is measured by the nontariﬀ barrier
(NTB) coverage ratio. This is a standard exercise in the literature (e.g., Goldberg
and Maggi, 1999; Mitra et al., 2002). z is measured as the inverse of the ratio of
consumption to total imports scaled by 10,000. e is derived from Shiels et al. (1986)
14and corrected for measurement error by GB. A brief description of the variables used
in the current study is provided in Table 1. See GB for more details. Table 2 provides
the sample statistics of the variables. As is clear from Table 2, 114 of 242 industries
(47%) have zero protection. This suggests the potential importance of dealing with
the corner solution outcome of T.
5. Estimation Results
5.1. Quantile Regression Results
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the estimation results of equation (3). The results do
not appear to provide any supporting evidence for the PFS model; the null hypothesis
that β (τ)=0cannot be rejected at high quantiles (in fact, all quantiles) in favor of
the one-sided alternative that β (τ) > 0. Moreover, the point estimates indicate that
contrary to the PFS prediction, β (τ) are all negative at high quantiles and decrease
as τ goes from 0.4 to 0.9.
Note that α and β are estimated to be zero at the 0.1−0.4 quantiles. This suggests
that the corner solution (T =0 )g r e a t l ya ﬀect the estimates at the lower quantiles.
From this evidence, it is conjectured that the existence of corners also aﬀects the
estimates at the mean. Thus, ﬁndings based on the linear model in Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), Bombardini (2005), and others are likely to be subject to bias
15due to the corner solution problem. In contrast, our method does not suﬀer from the
problem, since the focus is mainly on the higher quantiles where the eﬀect of corner
solution is minimal. In addition, our method has a distinct advantage over the other
estimation strategy in the literature. To address the corner solution problem, several
studies (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Biesebroeck et al., 2004) estimate a system
of equations: equation (2) as well as an import penetration equation and an equation
for political organization. While dealing with the existence of corners, this strategy
requires the joint normality assumption on the error terms which potentially aﬀects
the estimation results. In contrast, our results are not driven by the parametric
assumption on the error term; it is not required by the quantile regression.
As the table indicates, β (τ) starts from zero at the quantile τ =0 .4 (since there
are a large number group of unprotected industries for whom the coverage ratio is
zero) and decreases as τ goes from 0.4 to 0.9. N o t et h a tt h i si st h eopposite of
what the PFS model predicts, casting doubt on the validity of the PFS model. It
is fair to say that our argument here relies on the point estimates. The estimated
standard errors are rather large and none of the β (τ)’s is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. If the reader is not satisﬁed with our argument based on the point estimates,
the evidence should be interpreted as suggesting that there is no strong evidence
in favor of the PFS model (This applies to also to evidence from the instrumental
16variable quantile regression presented in the next subsection). Two aspects of the
results are worth mentioning. First, α and β are estimated to start from zero at
the 0.4 quantile, suggesting the corner solution (Tj =0 )g r e a t l ya ﬀect the estimates
at the lower quantiles. From this evidence, it is conjectured that the existence of
corners also aﬀects the estimates at the mean. Thus, ﬁndings based on the linear
model in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Bombardini (2005), and others are
likely to be subject to bias due to such corners. To address this issue, several studies
(e.g., Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Biesebroeck et. al., (2004)) estimate a system
of equations: equation (2.2), explicitly allowing for such truncation of protection
at zero, as well as an import penetration equation, and an equation for political
organization. On the other hand, the assumption of normality of the error terms is
usually made and this may aﬀect the estimation results. In contrast, our estimation
results are unlikely to be subject to the corner solution problem, since we focus mainly
on the higher quantiles where the eﬀect of corner solution is minimal. Second, our
results are not driven by the parametric assumption on the error term; the quantile
regression does not require them.
One might wish to control for various factors as well. Following Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), we control for tariﬀ of intermediate goods (INTERMTAR)
and NTB coverage of intermediate goods (INTERMNTB). As column 2 of Table 2
17shows, our main ﬁndings do not change; β (τ) decreases (for the most part) from zero
t oan e g a t i v ev a l u ew i t ht h ei n c r e a s ei n,contrary to what the PFS model predicts. α
and β are found to be be zero at the and quantiles, again suggesting the importance
of corner solution.
5.2. IV Quantile Regression Results
Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation (4). Our choice of instruments
is guided by GB where they used 34 distinct instruments, their quadratic terms,
and some of the two-term cross products. We use a subset of their instruments (17
instruments) indicated in Table 1. These are also used in Bombardini (2005) as
the basic instruments. We use two sets of instruments. Instrument set 1 consists
of the 17 instruments, their squared terms and the squares of INTERMTAR and
INTERMNTB. Instrument set 2 includes instrument set 1 and the interaction
terms of the 17 instruments. The IV quantile results for the instrument set 1 are
reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.1. As in the quantile regression, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that β(0.9) = 0 in favor of the one-sided alternative. The
point estimates are not favorable for the PFS model, either. Even after correcting
for the endogeneity of Z, the estimate of β at the highest quantile is not positive as
r e q u i r e db yt h eP F Sm o d e l .T h er e s u l t sr e m a i nv i r t u a l l yt h es a m ew h e nw eu s et h e
18instrument set 2 as IV’s. (columns 3 and 4).
We further control for capital-labor ratio in equation (4). This is essentially equiv-
alent to allowing capital-labor ratio to be a determining factor for the probability of
political organization. This speciﬁcation is motivated by Mitra (1999)w h op r o v i d e s
a theory of endogenous lobby formation. The model predicts that among others,
industries with higher levels of capital stock are likely to be politically organized.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.2. β (τ) again are estimated to be
zero at quantiles τ =0 .1, and are negative at higher quantiles, except at the 90%
quantile when instrument set 2 is used.
Another potential source of bias is when the political organization dummy is
econometrically endogenous. That is, when the error term of the equation deter-
mining the political organization is correlated with the error term of the protection
equation (4). In this paper, we are less concerned about it for the following three
reasons. First, in GM correlation comes from the measurement of the political or-
ganization dummy coming from the campaign contribution, which is likely to be
correlated with the protection measure. Since we do not use the political organiza-
tion dummy, we are not subject to it. Secondly, GM and others have shown that
the results do not change when they control for the endogeneity of the political or-
ganization. Thirdly, as long as the error term of the equation determining political
19organization and that of the protection equation are positively correlated, which is
the likely direction of correlation, if there is any, then out quantile IV procedure will
still be consistent. This is because the political organization dummies do not enter in
the RHS of the estimating equation, and with positive correlation, after controlling
for Z we still would see most of the industries in high quantiles (i.e. industries whose
error term of the protection equation are high) to be politically organized. The only
case where the IV quantile regression results for high quantiles gives biased estimate
of γ + δ is when, given Zj the politically organized industries have equal or less
protection than the unorganized ones, which we believe to be an unlikely scenario.
Although we use a subset of GB’s instruments, our results may be driven by too
many instruments. Thus, we further estimate equation (4) using only one of the
following instruments at a time: SCIENTISTS, MANAGERS,a n dCROSSELI
and using all of them (see Table 1 for their deﬁnitions). These instruments are found
to be strongly correlated with Z in GB. The results are presented in Table 4. The re-
sults suggest that having many instruments aﬀect the estimates of β (τ).S p e c i ﬁcally,
the absolute magnitude of the coeﬃcients now become far larger than that obtained
with the larger number of instruments. Nonetheless, our main ﬁndings appear to be
robust; regardless of which instrument we use and whether we control for capital-
labor ratio, the null hypothesis at the highest quantile cannot be rejected. Moreover,
20the point estimates of β (τ) are all negative at high quantiles, and signiﬁcant when
all three IV’s are used and capital labor ratio is included in the set of controls, which
is inconsistent with the PFS’s prediction.
6. Discussion
There are several possibilities to explain our results. The ﬁrst possibility is het-
eroskedasticity. If the error term has higher variance when the industry is politically
unorganized, i.e.,
εj = wj +( 1− Ij)ζj
then politically unorganized industries would have error terms with much higher
variance. As a result, they would be the ones that dominate in high quantiles as
well as in low quantiles, whereas the politically organized industries would be found
mostly around the median. Hence, at high quantiles, the negative quantile regres-
sion coeﬃcients correspond to γ, which is negative, and not γ + δ>0.T h i s m a y
explain the presence of negative slope coeﬃcients in the higher quantiles. The pos-
sibility cannot be completely ruled out. However, it is worth pointing out that
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) did test for heteroskedasticity and the null hypothesis
21of homoskedasticity could not be rejected.7
Second, the small sample may make it diﬃcult for our approach to provide evi-
dence favoring the PFS model. This problem can be overcome by using more disag-
gregated data, although such an exercise is beyond the scope of the current paper.
The third possibility is that the PFS model is indeed not the one that explains
the data well. If so, what model would better explain the data? Here, we consider an
alternative model, the “Surge Protection” model (hereafter, the SP model) recently
proposed by Imai et al. (2006). The SP model is meant to loosely replicate the
institutional setup in the United States. It is a simple non-optimizing model where
politically organized industries can obtain a limit on imports if imports increase above
as p e c i ﬁed threshold. The idea is that today most countries have signed the GATT
and joined the WTO. In doing so, they have bound their tariﬀs and committed
to limits on their ability to change trade policy. As a result, the main scope for
trade policy lies in the safeguard or escape clause realm where temporary protection
may be aﬀorded an industry that is under stress and organized enough to lobby for









Ij + ςj (1 − Ij)+wj.
Importantly, the modiﬁed equation has an additional term 1 − Ij with a random coeﬃcient ςj.
Then, the original lobbying model needs to be substantially modiﬁed so that the reduced form
of the PFS equation results to the modiﬁed equation above. Then, it would be unclear whether
ﬁndings in past studies (i.e., γ<0, δ>0,a n dγ +δ>0) can be interpreted as being in support of
the PFS paradigm.
22protection. The detail of the SP model is provided in Appendix 2 and further details
are explicated in Imai et al. (2006).
To examine the validity of the SP model, we conduct the following exercise.
First, artiﬁcial data are simulated from a calibrated version of the SP model. The
p a r a m e t e r si nt h em o d e la r es e ti nt h ee x a c t l ys a m em a n n e ra si nI m a ie ta l .( 2 0 0 6 ) ;
the simulated data reasonably match the aggregate statistics of the U.S. data, as
illustrated in Imai et al. (2006). We then estimate equations (3) and (4) on the
simulated data using quantile and IV quantile regressions, respectively . We ask
whether the parameter estimates from the simulated data resemble those reported
in the previous section. If the SP model is valid, then the patterns exhibited in the
former are expected to be similar with those in the latter.
In the original SP model, all politically organized subindustries are assumed to
have a uniform level of quota, (See Appendix 2). Since this is rather a strong as-
sumption, we slightly extend the SP model by allowing the quota to be stochastically
determined. Speciﬁcally, we add some randomness to the quota, i.e.,
ˆ Qij = b Q + ς,ς˜N(0,1)
where is the quota level for politically organized subindustries ij. Using simulated
data from this model (the modiﬁed SP model), we estimate equations (3) and (4)
23again. The quantile regression results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.
The coeﬃcients on Z are found to be zero at lower quantiles, and thereafter decrease
with quantile, which is consistent with the results of the actual data. A similar
pattern is observed for the IV quantile regression (Table 6 Column 1 and 2). It is
also noteworthy that the size of β’s is by and large similar with that obtained from
the actual data with one instrument (Table 4).
The results overall suggest that the feature of the SP model is more consistent
with the actual data than the PFS model. The intuition behind the negative coef-
ﬁcient estimate of the SP model is simple. A surge in imports, which increases the
import penetration ratio, tends to result in the quota being binding, which corre-
sponds to an increase in the NTB coverage ratio. Hence, the negative relationship is
observed between the inverse import penetration ratio and the NTB coverage ratio.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new test of the PFS model that does not require data
on political organizations. The test is based on a certain prediction of the PFS
model which has not been explored in the literature: given that industries with
higher protection measures are more likely to be politically organized, the eﬀect
of the inverse import penetration ratio on protection at higher quantiles tends to
24reﬂect that of politically organized ones. We tested this prediction using the quantile
regression and IV quantile regression techniques. The ﬁndings are not supportive
of the PFS model, unlike those in past studies in the literature. Clearly, more
evidence is needed to conclude the empirical validity of the PFS. One fruitful research
avenue is to analyze diﬀerent countries than United States. Such an exercise can be
done relatively easily, as our method does not require data on political organization.
Another research avenue is to use more disaggregated data so that our approach can
provide statistically more clear-cut evidence.
We also examined the validity of the SP model proposed in Imai et al. (2006).
Using simulated data arising from the SP model, we run the same regressions as in
those for the actual data. The estimated coeﬃc i e n t sa r em o r ei nl i n ew i t ht h o s eo f
the actual data. The ﬁndings overall seem to suggest that the SP model is consistent
with the data while the PFS is not so.
25Table 1: Deﬁnition of the Variables
Variable IV Description
t
All NTB coverage ratios









of intermediate goods use
e 1




Log of absolute import elasticity
after correcting for measurement
errors
ln(HERF)3




Log of percentage of an
industry’s shipment used as







Fraction of employees classiﬁed
as scientists and engineers, 1982
MANAGERS 7 Fraction of employees classiﬁed as managerial,1982
UNSKILLED 8 Fraction of employees classiﬁed as unskilled,1982
CONC49 Four-ﬁrm concentration ratio, 1982
FIRMSCALE 10 Measure of industry scale: Value added per ﬁrm, 1982
TAR 11 U.S. post-Tokyo round ad valorem tariﬀs( R a t i o )
PERMELAST 12 Real exchange rate elasticity of imports
CROSSELI 13 Cross price elasticity of imports
(K/L)1 14 Capital-Labor ratio, food processing
(K/L)2 15 Capital-Labor ratio, resource intensive
(K/L)3 16 Capital-Labor ratio, general manufacturing
(K/L)4 17 Capital-Labor ratio, capital intensive
27Table 2: Quantile Regression8
(QT (τ|Zj)=α(τ)+β (τ)Zj/10000)
(1) (2)
τ (quantile) α(τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.056) 0.000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.060)
0.20 .000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.079) 0.000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.080)
0.30 .000 (0.006) 0.000 (0.091) −0.026 (0.014) −0.099 (0.153)
0.40 .000 (0.006) 0.000 (0.097) −0.029 (0.014) −0.020 (0.092)
0.50 .002 (0.006) −0.003 (0.099) −0.026 (0.014) −0.032 (0.094)
0.60 .028 (0.006) −0.046 (0.098) −0.053 (0.024) −0.082 (0.093)
0.70 .077 (0.010) −0.126 (0.095) −0.044 (0.017) −0.125 (0.090)
0.80 .157 (0.026) −0.258 (0.094) −0.046 (0.018) −0.145 (0.086)
0.90 .308 (0.040) −0.505 (0.089) −0.001 (0.021) −0.225 (0.075)
GB Controls No Yes
8Note: This table provide the estimation results of equation (3). Standard errors are in paren-
these. “GB Controls” indicate whether INTERMTAR and INTERMNTB are controlled for.
For the deﬁnition of these variables, see Table 1.
28Table 3.1: IV Quantile Regression9
τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.407) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.270)
0.20 .000 (0.012) 0.000 (0.402) 0.000 (0.011) 0.000 (0.369)
0.3 −0.025 (0.011) −0.370 (0.357) −0.026 (0.011) −0.370 (0.287)
0.4 −0.028 (0.009) −0.200 (0.621) −0.029 (0.009) −0.200 (0.421)
0.5 −0.031 (0.023) −0.270 (1.395) −0.026 (0.023) −0.270 (1.091)
0.6 −0.053 (0.023) −0.080 (2.153) −0.053 (0.024) −0.080 (1.184)
0.7 −0.044 (0.015) −0.130 (2.403) −0.044 (0.014) −0.130 (1.611)
0.8 −0.046 (0.016) 0.020 (2.722) −0.046 (0.014) 0.020 (1.826)
0.9 −0.002 (0.044) −0.230 (3.572) −0.001 (0.042) −0.230 (3.383)
GB Controls Yes Yes
K/L No No
Instruments Set 1 Set 2
9Note: This table provide the estimation results of equation (4). Standard errors are in paren-
these. They are calculated by 200 bootstrap resampling. “GB Controls” and “K/L” indicate
whether INTERMTAR and INTERMNTB are controled for and whether (K/L)i, (i =1,2,3,4) are
controled for, respectively. “Instruments” indicates which variables are used as instrumental vari-
ables. “Set 1” include IV1-17, their quadratic terms, and the quadratic terms of GB controls. “Set
2” include “Set 1” plus the interaction terms involving IV1. For the deﬁnition of these variables,
see Table 1.
29Table 3.2 IV Quantile Regression
τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.592) 0.000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.582)
0.2 −0.037 (0.018) −0.050 (0.496) −0.036 (0.017) −0.110 (0.944)
0.3 −0.037 (0.012) −0.050 (0.391) −0.036 (0.010) −0.190 (0.338)
0.4 −0.060 (0.017) −0.020 (0.798) −0.043 (0.017) −0.140 (0.359)
0.5 −0.043 (0.030) −0.250 (1.241) −0.060 (0.033) −0.250 (0.828)
0.6 −0.100 (0.033) −0.540 (2.085) −0.103 (0.035) −0.270 (1.602)
0.7 −0.080 (0.028) −0.120 (2.388) −0.080 (0.031) −0.120 (2.031)
0.8 −0.059 (0.022) −0.160 (2.794) −0.059 (0.024) −0.160 (2.387)
0.9 −0.037 (0.054) −0.250 (3.077) −0.070 (0.064) 4.190 (3.444)
GB Controls Yes Yes
K/L Yes Yes
Instruments Set 1 Set 2
30Table 4: IV Quantile Regression 10
τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.566) 0.000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.667)
0.20 .000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.755) −0.040 (0.037) 0.690 (5.422)
0.3 −0.018 (0.047) −4.270 (15.28) −0.042 (0.061) 3.340 (14.78)
0.4 −0.024 (0.033) 2.290 (10.25) −0.034 (0.033) −0.270 (4.210)
0.5 −0.027 (0.018) −0.140 (1.205) −0.042 (0.060) −2.910 (13.43)
0.6 −0.032 (0.034) −4.740 (10.23) −0.070 (0.076) −6.210 (18.40)
0.7 −0.043 (0.027) −3.890 (7.039) −0.060 (0.043) −3.400 (8.382)
0.8 −0.040 (0.022) −2.910 (4.023) −0.057 (0.064) −7.380 (15.69)
0.90 .111 (0.047) −9.590 (8.541) 0.089 (0.114) −10.53 (21.70)
GB Controls Yes Yes
K/L No Yes
Instruments Scientists Scientists
10GB Controled for,with strong instruments only Note: This table provide the estimation results
of equation (4). Standard errors are in parenthese. They are calculated by 200 bootstrap resam-
pling. Both INTERMTAR and INTERMNTB are controled for. “K/L” indicate whether (K/L)i, (i
=1,2,3,4) are controled for. “Instruments” indicates which variables are used as instrumental vari-
ables. “Set 1” include IV1-17, their quadratic terms, and the quadratic terms of GB controls. “Set
2” include “Set 1” plus the interaction terms involving IV1. For the deﬁnition of these variables,
see Table 1.
31Table 4 Continued
τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.014) 0.000 (0.878) 0.000 (0.018) 0.000 (0.744)
0.20 .000 (0.018) 0.000 (1.171) −0.038 (0.020) 0.000 (0.958)
0.3 −0.030 (0.025) 0.870 (4.928) −0.043 (0.033) 0.440 (3.955)
0.4 −0.032 (0.024) −0.600 (4.548) −0.043 (0.024) −0.010 (1.162)
0.5 −0.037 (0.026) −1.300 (6.201) −0.055 (0.035) −0.840 (5.087)
0.6 −0.037 (0.033) −4.370 (10.02) −0.078 (0.047) −3.290 (10.04)
0.7 −0.040 (0.033) −5.350 (9.584) −0.047 (0.072) −6.680 (16.39)
0.8 −0.002 (0.045) −9.450 (11.36) 0.053 (0.094) −12.89 (18.19)
0.90 .098 (0.046) −8.690 (8.081) 0.095 (0.069) −12.14 (10.84)




τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.687) 0.000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.713)
0.20 .000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.916) −0.029 (0.087) −7.490 (23.21)
0.3 −0.023 (0.043) −4.070 (12.70) −0.034 (0.046) −2.270 (8.778)
0.4 −0.027 (0.032) −2.570 (8.367) −0.041 (0.035) −0.780 (4.799)
0.5 −0.038 (0.024) −1.260 (5.271) −0.057 (0.036) −1.570 (5.868)
0.6 −0.051 (0.024) −0.510 (7.201) −0.077 (0.041) −4.040 (8.927)
0.7 −0.041 (0.038) −7.720 (11.80) −0.060 (0.043) −3.550 (10.07)
0.8 −0.031 (0.031) −5.280 (8.244) −0.054 (0.048) −6.450 (10.61)
0.90 .098 (0.053) −8.690 (11.19) 0.087 (0.092) −7.870 (15.12)




τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.857) 0.000 (0.014) 0.000 (1.054)
0.20 .000 (0.013) 0.000 (2.763) −0.027 (0.012) −11.90 (4.915)
0.3 −0.018 (0.043) −17.81 (5.865) −0.032 (0.012) −4.810 (4.567)
0.4 −0.021 (0.015) −7.160 (4.612) −0.036 (0.019) −4.740 (4.228)
0.5 −0.019 (0.025) −7.180 (5.405) −0.040 (0.037) −8.320 (5.529)
0.6 −0.033 (0.023) −8.500 (5.132) −0.075 (0.039) −4.150 (4.335)
0.7 −0.043 (0.020) −3.890 (3.976) −0.056 (0.037) −3.610 (3.873)
0.8 −0.029 (0.037) −4.970 (4.058) −0.057 (0.060) −7.360 (4.680)
0.90 .079 (0.070) −5.780 (4.700) 0.090 (0.113) −10.90 (5.084)
GB Controls Yes Yes
K/L No Yes
Instruments All 3 IV’s All 3 IV’s
34Table 5: Quantile Regression Estimates of Surge Protection Model
SP Modiﬁed SP
τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
0.20 .000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.091) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.030)
0.30 .000 (0.006) 0.000 (2.658) 0.000 (0.002) −0.045 (0.696)
0.40 .020 (0.066) −6.672 (5.798) 0.006 (0.006) −1.973 (1.985)
0.50 .042 (0.007) −11.333 (2.641) 0.020 (0.006) −5.125 (1.759)
0.60 .044 (0.001) −9.615 (1.618) 0.033 (0.006) −6.686 (1.721)
0.70 .046 (0.001) −7.841 (1.479) 0.049 (0.006) −7.854 (2.022)
0.80 .046 (0.000) −6.076 (1.388) 0.072 (0.008) −8.666 (2.469)
0.90 .047 (0.000) −4.276 (1.186) 0.111 (0.013) −9.214 (3.103)
35Table 6: Quantile IV Regression Estimates of Surge Protection Model
SP Modiﬁed SP
τα (τ) β(τ) α(τ) β(τ)
0.10 .000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
0.20 .004 (0.008) −2.000 (4.755) 0.000 (0.031) −0.093 (0.009)
0.30 .031 (0.015) −15.330 (7.286) 0.000 (0.002) −2.931 (0.292)
0.40 .042 (0.004) −17.000 (2.153) 0.006 (0.670) −7.210 (0.718)
0.50 .043 (0.001) −14.240 (1.613) 0.018 (1.921) −8.934 (0.891)
0.60 .044 (0.000) −11.540 (1.349) 0.038 (1.836) −9.866 (0.985)
0.70 .044 (0.000) −9.450 (1.141) 0.053 (2.162) −10.832 (1.082)
0.80 .045 (0.000) −7.430 (1.138) 0.073 (2.618) −11.078 (1.109)
0.90 .045 (0.003) −5.390 (1.074) 0.110 (3.342) −10.531 (1.078)
8. Appendix 1A: Quantile Regression
Let Tj =
tj
1+tj and Zj =
zj
ej.
Proposition 1. (Quantile Regression) Assume that (1) Zjis bounded below by
a positive number, i.e. there exists Z > 0 such that Zj ≥ Z,( 2)   has a smooth
36density function which has support that is bounded from above and below, (3)   is
independent of both Zj and and Ij,a n d( 4) δ>0. Then, for τ suﬃciently close to
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, or τ = P (Ij =0 )+τ
0P (Ij =1 ). (8.5)
37From equation (8.5), we can see that for τ % 1, τ0 % 1 as well. Hence, for τ
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P (Ij =1 )
= P(Ij =0 )+τ − P (Ij =0 )=τ.
Therefore, for τ suﬃciently close to 1,
QT (τ|Zj)=T = F
−1
  (τ
0)+( γ + δ)Zj.
38We make two remarks on the assumptions. First, we assume that   has bounded
support (assumption 2). This assumption is reasonable since the protection measure
is usually derived from the NTB coverage ratio (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi (1999),
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)) and therefore it is clearly bounded above and
below. Second, we assume that   is independent of both Zj and and Ij (assumption
3). This is rather a strong assumption and will be relaxed when quantile IV’s are
discussed.
When we introduce IV’s we show that β (τ) → (γ + δ) > 0 as τ % 1.
Assume the model is as follows:
T
∗
j = γZj +  j if Ij =0
T
∗
j =( γ + δ)Zj +  j if Ij =1
where
Zj = g(Wj,v j).
39Wj is an instrument vector and vj is a random variable independent of Wj.L e tu s
deﬁne uj as follows:
 j = E [ j|vj]+uj,u j ≡  j − E [ j|vj],
where uj is assumed to be i.i.d. distributed. Furthermore,







Then, for Ij =0the model satisﬁes the assumptions A1-A5 of Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2006). Similarly for Ij =1 . Therefore, from Theorem 1 of Chernozhukov
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= τ for Ij =1 .
Proposition 2. (Quantile IV) Assume that Zj is bounded below by a positive
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From the deﬁnition of τ0,f o rτ % 1, τ0 % 1 as well. Hence, for τ suﬃciently close to
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= τ.
9. Appendix 2: Surge Protection Model.
In what follows, we detail the SP model. Our procedure follows Imai et. al. (2006)
and is explained in Appendix 2. First, consider the domestic and foreign goods
equilibrium without quota. For each industry i and subindustry j,t h e r ea r et w o
types of goods: domestic and foreign goods. To make matters simple, we assume
that each good’s demand depends only on its own price and random shocks and that
h o m ei st h eo n l ys o u r c eo fd e m a n d . L e txH
ij be the equilibrium quantity of home
42goods in industry i subindustry j,a n dl e tpH
ij be its equilibrium price.
The equilibrium is described by the demand and supply equations. The demand
for industry i subindustry j of the home good depends on a constant, the price of
the good, and random terms as follows:
lnx
Hd
ij = ahd1 + ahd2 lnp
H
ij + xhdi + uhdij.
Similarly, the supply of the same good follows the supply equation:
lnx
Hs
ij = ahs1 + ahs2 lnp
H
ij + xhsi + uhsij.
The random terms xhdi and xhsi are industry speciﬁc demand and supply shocks,
and hence, common across all subindustries, while uhdij and uhsij are subindustry
speciﬁc demand and supply shocks and are idiosyncratic to each subindustry. All
shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. with mean zero normal distributions with standard








43Similarly, let import demand be given by
lnx
Md
ij = amd1 + amd2 lnp
M




ij = ams1 + ams2 lnp
M
ij + xmsi + umsij.
As before, the random terms xmdi,x m s i,u m d ij,a n dumsij are industry and subindus-
try speciﬁc demand and supply shocks. They are distributed i.i.d. normally with









We assume that there are nt =2 5 0industries and each industry has nj =6
subindustries. Each subindustry ij is politically organized with probability Poi.
We simulate the output and prices of each subindustry by ﬁrst drawing nt industry
demand and supply shocks xmdi and xmsi for i =1 ,...,n t and for each industry i,
drawing ns subindustry demand and supply shocks umdij and umsij for j =1 ,...,ns.
Then, given these shocks and parameters of the demand and supply equations, we
compute the equilibrium price and quantities for each subindustry ij.
44We then simulate the political organization for each subindustry and introduce
au n i f o r mq u o t al e v e l ˆ Q for all politically organized subindustries. That is, the
quota becomes binding in subindustry ij if the equilibrium output for the foreign
goods exceeds ˆ Q.L e t d
q
ij be the indicator for a binding quota. That is, if xMe
ij for
subindustry ij exceeds ˆ Q, then actual imports, xM
ij ,e q u a l ˆ Q and d
q





ij =0 . One way of interpreting this is that there is a trigger level of
imports, ˆ Q, above which the relevant agency would restrict imports if asked, but only
politically organized agencies ask for such protection. In other words, that there are
provisions for preventing a surge of imports, but only organized subindustries can
actually make use of these provisions perhaps because they can overcome the usual
free rider problems.
Next we aggregate subindustry output to the industry level. Total industry equi-



















We then generate the variables that we use in the estimation as follows. First,











That is, coverage ratio is the fraction of industry output i where quota is binding.
Furthermore, the inverse import penetration ratio, zi, for industry i is the ratio of
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